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VIOLENT TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES AND
THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE AND PEACE
Doris Goedl
INTRODUCTION
This century has often been described as an Age of Extremes, as a
time of violence and barbarism.

Political and social instability have

characterized conflicts in all parts of the world. Relative stability marked
the period of 1945 until 1989. After 1989, political and socioeconomic
changes and upheavals started in the former socialist countries. Some
countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary transformed mostly in
a peaceful way, whereas other countries like former Yugoslavia went
through a period of war, genocide and man-made disaster. In trying to
understand the aftermath of violent disintegration in the former
Yugoslavia, this paper will focus on the war in Bosnia. In addition, I will
stress the following points:
1. The interplay between politics, law and justice in the case of
former Yugoslavia;
2. The interplay between international and domestic politics; and
3. Trauma in the political context – the level of the victims
1. The Ongoing War In Bosnia And The Establishing Of The
International Criminal Tribunal For Yugoslavia (ICTY)
After the declarations of independence in Slovenia and Croatia in
1991 and 1992 respectively, and a vote for independence in Bosnia in
March of 1992, the Serbian nationalism stepped up and became violent.
This was evidenced by the shelling of Dubrovnik and the sack of Vukovar,
the first major crimes of these wars, followed by the onslaught of Bosnian
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Muslims and Croats.1 “Ethnic cleansing” was declared instrumental in
giving the state territorial definition, and mass-killings, terror, rapes and
other atrocities accompanied this policy. It was designed to render the
territory ethnically pure and ensure a hatred and fear that would endure
between Muslims and Serbs. As a result, these communities could never
again live together. Huge peace demonstrations were held in Sarajevo, but
when a sniper killed a Muslim girl, it became clear to nearly everybody
that there would be no peaceful reconciliation. On the contrary, as a
Bosnian Franciscan stated,
Then the sniper killed a Muslim girl of seven or eight years.
She was with her mother, on her hand and he saw that she
is a Muslim girl. He could have killed me, thousands of
other people who were there, but he killed this Muslim girl.
At this point I saw that Milosevic and his people need the
war. The non violent situation in Sarajevo became in this
moment an armed fight.2
By the end of 1992, Serb forces controlled approximately 70
percent of Bosnian territory, nearly 2 million Bosnians had lost their
homes; 1.1 million refugees were dispersed to different countries. The rest
of the Bosnians were forced to the three enclaves: Srebenica, Žepa and
Goradže, where the Muslim population held a majority. At the same time,
Lawrence Eagleburger, Bush’s secretary of state and former Ambassador
to Yugoslavia stated that there was a “moral and historical obligation not
to stand back a second time in this century while a people faces
obliteration.”

1

In doing so, he called for charges against Milošević,

See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 210 (2000) (citing CAB 23 / 43, Imperial War Cabinet 39, 28
November 1918, 11:45 a.m., at 2-5).
2
Interviews were conducted with fifty men and women in the former Yugoslavia as part
of an Austrian research project.
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Karadžić and Bosnian Serb Army chief Ratko Mladić for “crimes against
humanity.”3
In January 1993, there was already an interim report for the
Security Council, describing ethnic cleansing, mass murder, rape and other
atrocities. This interim report and a proposal by UN Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali led to an international tribunal in May 1993 to
examine war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, known as the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in The Hague.4

In

September of that year, eleven judges were appointed through the General
Assembly of the UN and in July 1994, Richard Goldstone was appointed
as the first chief prosecutor.

The expectations of the International

Community concerning the tribunal were serious but low. “I would not
measure the tribunal in terms of how many people go to jail, or top-level
people, because the number is going to be very low. Success is a
commitment to establish principles of accountability, getting out the
truth,” was the strong statement made by John Shattuck, assistant secretary
of state for Human Rights.5 Nevertheless, in February 1995, Richard
Goldstone indicted twenty-one Bosnian Serbs for running the Omarska
concentration camp [comma omitted] and camp commander Zeljko
Meakić was slapped with an indictment for genocide.
Out of the twenty-one men indicted, only Tadic, a low-level
official, was available for trial. When his case was opened in 1996, a lot
of indicted war criminals were still not transferred to The Hague, which
was discussed as a political problem. Because of a reluctant policy on the
part of the UN and NATO to enforce its edicts, the tribunal could only
inconvenience and stigmatize its suspects, and could only threaten the
3

See BASS, supra note 1, at 213.
The ICTY eventually became known as “The Hague,” or “The Hague Tribunal.”
5
See generally RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1999).
4
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governments in Croatia and Serbia with a report of their noncompliance to
the Security Council. Even after the “fall of Srebenica” in July 1995, there
was not really a breakthrough for the ICTY, because the West did not wish
to incur on one side during the preparations for the Dayton peace process
by subjecting their “war heroes” to prosecution and indictment.6 At this
point, Richard Goldstone was quite sure that the peace agreement in
Dayton contain a commitment by the signatories to hand over to the
Tribunal those accused of war crimes.
The military response to Goldstone came immediately. On the
same day, when The Hague Tribunal indicted the leader of the Bosnian
Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, and his military commander Mladic, the latter
was conquering Žepa, one of the declared UN “safe areas.” After that
event, NATO started with bombing of Bosnian Serb positions, which was
at this time easier, because there were no UN Protection Forces
(UNPROFOR) vulnerable to Serb hostage-taking.7

Hard pressed by

NATO bombing and by huge and rapid victories of the Croatian and
Bosnian army in northwestern Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs capitulated.
Richard Holbrooke brokered a cease-fire for Sarajevo and the Dayton
peace process came in his final phase. Nevertheless, when the parties in
Dayton reached an accord for the deployment of peacekeepers in Bosnia,
the mandate for the International Force remained vague with respect to
cooperation with The Hague. Missions to track down wanted men were
not foreseen either in the Dayton mandate or in the training provided to
the troops. According to Jonathan Bass, the American public was assured

6

During the fights in Srebenica between the 11th and 14th of July, 1995 Bosnian Serb
forces proceeded to slaughter at least seven thousand Muslims at Srebenica, the single
worst crime against humanity in Europe since World War II.
7
While conquering Srebenica, Mladic took 450 Dutch UNPROFOR troops hostage,
using them as human shields against NATO air strikes.
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by President Clinton that, “we’re not going to be rummaging around in the
mountains looking for war criminals.”8
When the Canadian Judge Louise Arbour succeed Richard
Goldstone, the policy of the Tribunal changed. First, she instituted the
practice of issuing sealed indictments, and secondly, she indicted
Slobodan Milošević for crimes against humanity in Kosovo.

“The

evidence upon which this indictment was confirmed raises serious
questions about their suitability to be the guarantors of any deal, let alone
a peace agreement.“9 This was the opposite position of Richard Holbroke
who gave the green light for his team to negotiate with Radovan Karadžić
and Ratko Mladic during the Dayton peace process.
2. The interplay between the ICTY and domestic political affairs
Establishing The Hague Tribunal was an important step to take
from the International Community to react to war crimes and genocide in
the former Yugoslavia. The next step, and I think this is a most difficult
step, had to deal with the interplay between the demands of international
judiciary and domestic policy. The interplay between international and
domestic law concerning truth and reconciliation is a very complicated
matter, especially when dealing with the political reactions in the different
states. Even when the democratic governments which replaced the former
authoritarian regimes in Croatia and Serbia (2000) made efforts to reform
their judicial system, we had to face limited public support for war crimes
prosecutions, especially against members of the ethnic majority. Human
Right Watch reported that police assistance to war crime prosecutors and
investigate judges remain half-hearted; in some cases police officers were
themselves implicated in the commission of war crimes.
8

Therefore,

See BASS, supra note 1, at 239 (quoting Dick Morris, a former pollster and strategist for
President Clinton).
9
Id. at 274.
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effective and fair prosecutions are possible only if governments are
seriously willing to commit themselves to create the conditions necessary
for crimes accountability.
In recent years, government support for domestic prosecutions of
members of the ethnic majority has gradually increased in BosniaHerzegowina and Croatia. Government officials in Serbia and Republika
Srpska have either opposed10 or grudgingly supported the work of the
Hague Tribunal. Official policy in Serbia states the support of domestic
prosecutions, but without the intention to arrest fugitives. Instead, the
authorities try to convince them to surrender voluntarily, as Carla del
Ponto stated.11 The hollowness of their support is evidenced by the fact
that there have been few domestic trials in Serbia, and virtually none in
Republika Srpska. “[I]t remains the case that, nine years after Dayton, the
authorities of Republika Srpska have not apprehended a single individual
indicted by the ICTY.”12
In 2002, The Hague Tribunal announced their intention to refer all
cases - not involving the main political and military figures from the
Yugoslav wars - to the national courts in the region, with the exception of
Serbia.13
10

See, e.g., Documentation Centre of Republic of SRPSKA & Bureau of Government of
RS for Relation with ICTY, Report about Case Srebrenica, at http://www.slobodanmilosevic.org/documents/srebrenica.pdf (Sep. 2002). – October 16, 2004 you can find a
file about the “Forbidden Srebrenica Report” where the Republika Srpska Bureau for
Cooperation with the ICTY exposed the official Srebenica report as a fraud.
11
Press Release, Address by Carla Del Ponte, prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council (Nov. 23,
2004) (CDP/P.I.S/917-e), available at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm. (last
visited Feb. 2005).
12
Id.
13
See Human Rights Watch, Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
and
Serbia
and
Montenegro,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty1004/3.htm (In fall 2004 the request for two
referrals to Croatia, and motion to referrals to Bosnia-Herzegowina were made by the
ICTY. But there is no indication that any cases will be transferred from the ICTY to the
Serbian judiciary.).
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There is a legitimate concern that a country like Serbia,
which is not willing to arrest indictees, will not either be
interested in, or capable of, trying alleged war criminals
domestically. The networks supporting persons accused of
war crimes are so powerful there, that they can interfere
with the juidical proceedings, including by intimidating
witnesses (...), or even by threatening the stability of the
country. Both in Serbia proper and in Kosovo, aggressive
nationalist rhetoric are being used in smear campaigns
against the Tribunal and its Prosecutor.14
This comprehensive statement of the Chief Prosecutor refers to another
problem of the ICTY- the ethnic bias of the tribunal. Based on trial
monitoring, Human Right Watch has concluded that bias by the judiciary
has influenced trials in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegowina, and Serbia. Looking
to Serbia it became clear what it meant. In the past three years only Serb
defendants had been prosecuted by Serb judges and prosecutors. The only
cases in Republika Srpska involve defendants of Serb ethnicity. Beside
ethnic bias on the part of judges and prosecutors, the key obstacles for fair
and effective trials include poor case preparation by prosecutors,
inadequate cooperation from the police in the conduct of investigations,
poor cooperation between the states on judicial matters, and ineffective
witness protection mechanisms.15
At the end of this chapter Carla del Ponte tried to find an answer
for the question about the achievements of the ICTY since his
implementation. “Although significant progress was achieved…, it has to
be stressed that a number of obstacles which are outside of the Tribunal’s

14

Press Release, supra note 11.
See Human Rights Watch, Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
and
Serbia
and
Montenegro,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty1004/5.htm#_Toc84316123 (According to Human
Rights Watch these obstacles were found in Croatia as well as in Bosnia-Herzegowina
and Serbia).
15
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control may still derail the completion strategy.”16 She addresses two
important obstacles to achieve completion: the lack of co-operation of the
states in arresting and transferring of persons indicted to The Hague, and
the failure to find important key indictees, like Radovan Karadžić, Ratko
Mladic and Ante Gotovina. Before these men are not arrested and referred
to The Hague, the work of the ICTY would not be completed. Therefore,
del Ponte urged the governments of Croatia, Serbia and BosniaHerzegowina to overtake their responsibility in bringing these fugitives to
The Hague.
3. Between Venegance and Forgiveness: Trauma in the Political
Context
Dealing with the political level of law and judiciary in post-war
societies, the question had to be asked: Must all societies pursue
prosecutions in order to comply with international human rights
standards? We can find different responses to this question. For example,
East Germany’s extension of public access to secret police files after 1989,
or Czech’s screening and removal of officials and civil servants involved
in the old regime from public office. These are less aggressive responses
than prosecution, but they satisfy people’s needs to know what happened.
Even though the successor states of former Yugoslavia didn’t brought
these issues to their national political agenda, and even though there were
consideration that foreign-imposed trials may cause a nationalist backlash,
it became clear that “international tribunals are better than the usual
alternative, which is simple venegance by aggrieved parties. It is not that
these complicated and often muddled trials are too noble to question; it is
that the other options would be worse.”17 As first results from my field
16
17

Press Release, supra note 11.
See BASS, supra note 1, at 285.
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research show, the wish for truth and justice is – at least in the female
interviewees - stronger than the longing for venegance or revenge, which I
want to demonstrate with the following narratives from Croatia and
Bosnia.18
“I’m still an expelled person with no rights.” - Female from Srebenica
In May 1993, troops of Arkan and Seselj
(paramilitary troops of the Bosnien Serbian Army) entered
Srebencia. First, they looted our houses, and then they
burned them. We hided [sic.] ourselves in the forests
around the city, but after the “big burning,” we came back.
It was better to be in the city, although everything was
nearly destroyed. Life was difficult in these days. The
bombing and shelling went on, a lot of refugees (approx.
60.000) from other cities were in the town and we hadn’t
enough to eat. The international aid didn’t really reached
[sic] us at this time. But then we started to organize
ourselves and the humanitarian aid from the International
Community was slowly provided. In summer 1993
Srebenica was declared as an UN-safe area. We thought
that the nightmare will be over; that the world is with us
and that there will be no more killing, bombing and so on
and so forth. This more or less peaceful situation lasted
until summer 1995. By then the Bosnian Serbs started again
with heavy bombing, even though we were declared as an
UN protected zone. But the UN troops withdrew from
Srebencia to the UN-base Potocari and we were asked to
move with them.
On July 11th the evacuation of Srebenica started.
There were buses waiting which should bring us to the UNbase; the first seperation started, when young men didn’t
board the buses but went instead to the forests. My son
was one of them and this was the last time I saw him. The
situation was totally chaotic, granates came from
everywhere; there were shootings; some people were in
buses, some tried to escape; dead and wounded people;
children crying and so on and so forth.

18

During my field research about the violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia, 50
interviews with men and women were conducted.
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I came with the rest of my family to the UN-base
Potocari which was already crowded with some 30.000
people from Srebenica. The whole night the base was
granated and on the next day the Serbian Army, the troops
of General Mladic, came and started to seperate men and
women. They took away my brother and in the following
night we could hear screaming and shouting. It was
horrible. The next day it became clear what had happened.
They had slaughtered the men and raped the women; 570
women never came back.
The following day the military started with the
deportations. Whereas the women, small children and
elderly people were forced to enter the already waiting
buses, the men and juvenile children were not allowed to
board the buses. They took my husband to the side and this
was the last time I saw him. I had to enter one of the
waiting bus, but I was shocked and paralysed with fear.
The bus driver said that he couldn’t help us and he had to
bring us to Tuzla. On the way we saw killings, dead
bodies, and again and again some militaries stopped our
buses and took out young women, who never came back.
Finally we arrived in Tuzla and months went by. I
was searching for my son, my husband and other family
members. Whereas my son was never found, I could
identify my husband in the year 2000, when they lifted a
mass-grave in Zvornik. He is now buried in Potocari,
which became a memorial site for the victims of Srebnica.
I’m still an expelled person with no rights. In the Republica
Srpska I don’t have the same rights like the Serbian
population and in the Croatian-Muslim Federation I don’t
have rights, because I’m not a citizen of the federation. To
seek justice I’m working in the organisation of the
“Mothers of the enclave Srebenica and Zepa” which is an
NGO and does – beside other things - a lot of work on the
disappeared (to register, to identity, to bury them) and try to
help their families.
“I seek justice towards a single person.“ - Female from Sarajevo
My father was killed near the mosque that means
somebody selected him because he was a Muslim. As far
as we know now, it would be possible to trace back this
killing. Yes, I wanted them to be punished. If I could

186
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figure out who killed my father I would seek for justice and
the indictment of this person. But otherwise I don’t have
anything against the people (refering to the Bosnian Serbs)
because that would be irrational. You can hate a concrete
person, but not the whole nation. Therefore I would seek
justice towards a single person and on this point I would
give no quarter.
“This is my duty as medical doctor. ” - Female from Baranja
At the end of the war I was working in the
ambulance of the Hospital in Baranja (East-Croatia). An
old man was brought for treatment and he asked me if I
would know where he is. I denied, but when he mentioned
the name of his wife I started to recognize him. He was in
jail because during the war he and his wife (both Serbs) had
killed sixteen Croats in a very perfidious way. They
searched the birth register, figured out the Croats and went
to visit them for coffee, and then they killed them. I asked
him for the reasons and he answered, “I did it for my
people.” Then he asked me if I [sic] still give him medical
treatment. To be honest, for a second, I thought I could kill
him and nobody would know. But then I said, yes of
course. This is my duty as a medical doctor. He was taken
by the UNPROFOR and is now in a jail in Serbia to wait
for his trial.
“I didn’t want to hate a whole nation.” - Female from Banja Luka
When the Bosnian Serbs took over Banja Luka the
police raided and looted flats and houses of the Muslim
population. First the police came to the house of my
grandparents and expelled them with force. They were old,
stayed their whole life in this house and had nowhere to go.
Afterwards the same happened to my parents. I was the last
in the row. When they came to my flat, the police officer
took his gun on my head and forced me out of my flat.
Later I lost my job too. But I didn’t leave the city because
this is what they wanted us to do, to become an “ethnical
[sic] cleaned” city.
After the war I saw this police officer in a coffee
shop and my first reaction was revenge. But then I
realized, if I would react in this way the process of

187

Vol. 3 [2005]

VIOLENT TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES, JUSTICE & PEACE
Doris Goedl

188

forgiving could never begin. And I didn’t want to spent the
rest of my life hating a whole nation. I ordered a coffee for
this police officer and he came to my table to ask who I’m.
I told him the story and he started to recognize me and I
said, “I could look in your eyes before and I could do the
same now.” He lowered his eyes and asked me to forgive
him. What I did! Since this time peace had became real
for me.
All these narratives show that these women had to face a living
after war, totalitarian terror, genocide or other mass atrocities. Armed
conflicts often mean loss of livelihood, abuse and rape. When people are
forced for political reasons like terror and war to undergo traumatic events
such as rape and violence, these occur in especially aversive conditions.
In many cases there are no preparations and these circumstances are
experienced as catastrophic or traumatic, often connected with feelings of
overpowering helplessness. In the case of Bosnia, many men and women
survivors made their traumatic experience (destruction of their homes,
forced expelling, rape) by people who had previously been neighbors.
The emotional consequences of the disruption of social bonds goes
along with a loss of confidence and trust in other people, as a kind of
destruction of personal and social connectedness. In this context, the
experiences of war and terror could be seen as central assault on the
dignity of men and women, leading to a loss of confidence in the world.
Backed with these psychological aspects,19 these narratives show the
importance of justice on a personal level. Beside international efforts of
dealing with war crimes, these women want to give testimony, to try to
face their perpetrators, and to seek for justice on an individual level, and
then they can start to forgive.
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These narratives show also very clearly that there are different
levels of truth and reconciliation:

the ICTY as huge international

framework (like the narrative from Sarajevo), the domestic level of
judiciary (like the narrative from Baranja and Sarajevo) and the efforts on
the level of the individuals.

Only the latter can forgive, because

forgiveness is something between human beings and needs the facing of
victim and perpetrator (like the narrative from Banja Luka). Furthermore,
these narratives show not only the connection between justice and peace,
they also break with the prejudice of the ”ancient hatred” in the balkans.
If truth is based on justice (on the elaborated interplay between the
different levels), if there is a process of public acknowledging of what had
happened, truth and reconciliation can be more than rhetoric.
Let me conclude these considerations with the following short
statement. I think the political efforts inventing the ICTY were important
steps towards justice and peace. Although there is some criticism, I agree
with Jonathan Bass who wrote that this kind of legalism will never make
up for the lives lost, but legalism is all we have now.20 It doesn’t make up
fo the losses, but the invention of international and national law and
justice is an important level for recovering from individual experienced
trauma. “Justice is essential to strengthen the rule of law, soften the
bitterness of victim’s families, and remove an obstacle to cooperation
among the parties.”21 With this approach the interplay between political
circumstances and individual violent experiences are put into the focus of
attention and became crucial for truth and reconciliation processes. In
working with victims of political violence, you can make the clients
19

At this point I don’t discuss the impact of unresolved history for truth and reconiliation,
but I want to stress the importance of dealing with the past for reconciliation in post-war
societies.
20
See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000).
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understand that the traumatic event wasn’t a personal failure, but it had to
do with the violated political circumstances. Therefore it is necessary that
politics take responsibility for what had happened, even if they deny their
responsibility, or hide or escape. Inventing trials like the Hague Tribunal
for accusing the misleading of political power (like torture, rape and masskillings) and for naming the perpetrators is an important first step towards
truth and justice. This is even more important as the truth about war
crimes is suppressed and neglected.
4. Epilogue
Hannah Arendt is right when she stated that we are unable to
forgive what we cannot punish and we are unable to punish what has
turned out to be unforgivable, and it would be wrong to do nothing.
Beside the powerful realist criticism of war crimes trials, that such efforts
will perpetuate a war, or destabilize postwar efforts to build a secure
pease, I will state – out of my long time experiences in former Yugoslavia
- that this kind of legalism will never make up for the lives lost, but
legalism is all we have now. Or to say it with Madeleine Albright,
Justice is essential to strengthen the rule of law, so often the
bitterness of victim’s families, and remove an obstacle to
cooperation among the parties. It will help ensure that our
forces can depart Bosnia without the fear that renewed
violence threatening U.S. interests might one day return. It
will establish a model for resolving ethnic differences by
the force of law rather than the law of force.22
If we believe that peace in post-war societies has different layers
(like economic stability, some kind of prosperity and perspectives for the

21
22

Albright Madeleine, Address at the Hague Tribunal (1997).
Albright Madeleine, Address at the Hague Tribunal (1997).
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future), justice had to be seen as “a parent to peace.”23 Therefore I would
like to see the Hague Tribunal as a parent to peace in former Yugoslavia,
because the treatment of the past through international and national law, as
well as through remembering and forgetting shapes not only the present,
but also the future of entire post-war societies. Trying to come to terms
with truth and reconciliation, a narrow route between too much memory
and too much forgetting had to be taken. “Nations like individuals need to
face up to and understand traumatic past events before they can put them
aside and move on to normal life.”24 Whereas nations had to deal with
their past on a collective level, victims and their families have a moral
right to know and to gain right-security and justice on an individual level.
The interplay between both can eventually lead to peace and
reconciliation, but it will take time.

23

Albright Madeleine, Address at the Hague Tribunal (1999).
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 118 (1998) (quoting Tina Rosenberg).
24

